Introduction.
Insurgents tend to be associated with guerrilla warfare, often a necessary amalgam of tactics insofar as irregular forces face state forces that possess, more often than not, superior capabilities. The insurgent however has much to consider if he is to field, and be successful at fielding, an overt front. This overt front -effectively a standing army -is necessary for the realization of territorial ambition; insofar as territory cannot be held, secured and administered by covert operatives. Much, however, is involved in mobilizing, equipping, training and deploying an army. The process of preparing the army itself takes time. An army deployed today may have taken years of planning and preparation. Moreover, even a well-trained and well equipped overt front still faces an uphill task, if open confrontation of state forces is the objective. Traditional state forces after all tend to have the doctrine, capabilities and, often, the experience, to engage comparable conventional forces, relative to irregular threats. Thus, even having a trained and equipped standing army, itself a considerable enterprise, does not guarantee battlefield success for the insurgent; insofar as he will be engaging the counterinsurgent in an area of warfare, warfighting, where the latter is strongest.
Surely then, given militaristic challenges of open confrontation, it would be better for the insurgent to simply remain a guerrilla? This is what John Mackinlay suggests where he unpacks post-Maoist approaches to violently contesting state power, and points out that this category of insurgent more often than not frustrates government forces by avoiding the engagement altogether. Rather than provoking the engagement, the archetypical insurgent chooses to wear out state forces by striking from covert positions and then retreating, usually to the countryside.
Where the insurgent in question is an "urban guerrilla" -operating in built-up spaces -he blends in with the local population (Mackinlay, 2012) . Regardless of where the insurgent chooses to pitch his tent, the doctrine is one of war avoidance, so activity is limited to the lower rungs of the conflict escalation ladder: kidnappings; jailbreaks; suicide bombings; market raids to replenish supplies; ambush tactics against small police and military detachments; acts of sabotage; acts of propaganda; minor skirmishes with security forces; and disruption of daily life, whether in urban or in rural areas.
Over time such minor acts add up to discrediting governance and the rule of law, in contested areas. Major battles are not required for governance and the writ of the state to eventually collapse. Indeed, such is the effectiveness of the guerrilla, that rampancy is not even required.
Infrequent attacks, at low levels of combat intensity, will suffice to strike terror into locals.
Better still if the government interprets the low intensity nature of conflict to mean military superiority should be asserted. This could eventually lead to an over-reactive target response: the detention of people, the kicking down of doors, indiscriminate use of force, and similar acts of coercion. The insurgent feeds off the blowback from this sort of target response. Some insurgency theories -Earnesto "Che" Guevera's Focoism idea system for instance -even suggest a target response by the state, marks a turning (Guevara, 1968) . This is because the insurgent, beyond that point, becomes a viable alternative to a state that not has only failed in its duty of governance and security but that brutalizes its population in addition. By reacting with coercion in a way that affects the local populace, the government's dereliction of duty provides an avenue to the insurgent to insinuate himself within the local population. He becomes the ultimate threat if he can do so: an enemy that can hide in plain sight is an enemy that cannot be defeated unless he can be separated, one way or another, from the population that looks just like him. Not surprisingly, guerrillas since antiquity have favoured this covert approach, to warfighting and direct confrontation. The theories are rich with contributions around why this approach to insurgency is more effective against the state, than the overt activity of a standing army.
Famous Argentine Marxist revolutionary, Enersto "Che" Guevara, for instance was not an advocate of open confrontation against state forces. Che Guevara preferred rather the use of "irregulars" to provoke the state into a target response. Indeed, Che's focoist approach entirely skips Mao Tse-tung's third phase of insurgency (open confrontation once a critical mass of local support is gained). Che instead places much emphasis on guerrilla warfare (1968) , with the local population as the foco (Spanish for focus). For Guevara, guerrilla warfare is an indispensable part of revolution. It is a means by which to discredit the state; a means by which to provoke a target response by the state; a means to gain local support; and, ultimately, a slow vehicle towards political legitimacy, if and when a critical mass of local support can be reached. Focoism, the ideology on which Guevara bases his approach to revolutionary warfare, therefore does not recommend undeliberate progression from the guerrilla phase of contestation (1968) .
And there is a reason why guerrilla warfare is so popular with rebels, historically and in contemporary instances: it works.
Indeed, so successful have loosely organized bands and irregulars been at frustrating much larger, professional and organized forces; and so often has guerrilla warfare been the choice of smaller, weaker forces; that irregulars may well have become the dominant military threat today (Gates, 2011; Boot, 2013) . Commenting on the preponderance of insurgent warfare, Max Boot observes that "since World War II, insurgency and terrorism have become the dominant forms of conflict-a trend likely to continue into the foreseeable future" (2013, p. xx). For Boot, guerrilla warfare is appealing to the insurgent because "it is cheap and easy; waging guerrilla warfare does not require procuring expensive weapons systems or building an elaborate bureaucracy. And it works. At least sometimes" (2013, p. xx).
Guerrilla warfare constitutes a staple in Boko Haram's insurgency strategy; it is a critical element of Boko Haram's military doctrine; and it is the platform on which Boko Haram launched its campaign since the Bauchi Prison jailbreak of September 2010. Now, some may be surprised at how effective Boko Haram's guerrilla plank has since gone on to be. Yet the evidence supporting the viability of guerrilla warfare, against a more powerful opponent, is difficult to refute. In over thirty centuries of war, irregulars have confounded much larger, considerably better equipped militaries, time and again (Boot, 2013) .
Boko Haram exploited the numerous advantages of guerrilla warfare, in making its covert front the main plank of anti-government resistance, between 2011 and 2014. As the overt plank of Boko Haram's operations came into its own by 2014, there was a noticeable reduction in covert operations as military fighting and a territory-seeking doctrine was implemented by Boko
Haram's army of irregulars. Yet, even in such circumstances, the insurgent's covert front remained a formidable background threat; one that never went away. Consequently, with its overt front losing 90 per cent of its territory and greatly degraded by March and April of 2015, Boko Haram reverted to first principle, and to guerrilla warfare. This is not surprising. Boko
Haram as an insurgent has been more effective as a guerrilla, rather than as a war fighter. I make the case for this argument, in the pages that follow.
Efficiency versus Effectiveness.
Boko Haram is an efficient guerrilla. At one point in its campaign, Boko Haram was causing so many civilian casualties, with so few attacks, that no other perpetrator group in the world -not even Daesh -had its casualties-per-attack ratio. Boko Haram is also efficient because the overall financial and military cost of its insurgency -comparative to the millions displaced, the thousands killed, the military mobilization to counter its threat, and indeed the scale of the conflict it has generated in north-east Nigeriais negligible. As Boot notes, insurgency, is "cheap" (2013, p. xx).
Boko Haram also is an effective guerrilla. Its attacks have been able to penetrate even hardened Nigerian Army, security and government locations. As far back as 2011, even before Boko
Haram was proficient in martyrdom operations (al-amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya or istishhad for short), the group was able to successfully deploy vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) at the United Nations building, and at the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) headquarters, in 2011 (The BBC, 2011b; The BBC, 2011c Haram. It was a bitter experience; one the insurgent is yet to fully recover from as of April 2017.
Supplies, logistics, troop movement, provision of morale, the sustainability of land objectives, defensibility of each location, reinforcements (or the lack thereof). Each of these are the warfighter's concern; and this is even aside from the actual business of warfighting. The guerrilla on the other hand simply needs to have war avoidance doctrine that he can skilfully implement. Avoid major engagement at all costs; and avoid being caught, while harassing the government and terrorizing locals using minimal resource exertion, and the guerrilla is efficient at establishing his threat. Where said harassment becomes such a concern that the government's ability to secure its own territories is discredited, then the insurgent is also effective at his task.
In this sense, an effective guerrilla should not be confused for an effective warfighter.
As the above charts indicate, Boko Haram's effectiveness as a terrorist guerrilla outfit is
unquestionable. Yet its military fighting, and its decision to pursue a territory-seeking strategy, has been costly. Haram's losses were losses that betrayed questionable decision-making, a faulty war calculus, and poor comprehension of the difference between capturing and holding strategic territory. In this sense, Boko Haram's pivot away from military fighting to covert activity aimed at terrorizing locals and keeping the Nigerian military presence on edge, should be seen as a sign of weakness; though not as a sign of imminent collapse. If Boko Haram had a combat-ready army of irregulars, it is incomprehensible that its overt front formations will not be fielded for over a year. Armies require food, equipment and supplies, the absence of disease and the availability of water; but they also need to be active, whether via exercises or actual operations, in order to stay combat ready and disciplined. insurgent's objective is the capture of a certain town, or the defence of a particular location, the counter-insurgent can plan ahead, mobilize forces and set out a task. Such a task, moreover, is more likely to have clear parameters for its completion; and so, progress can be measured.
Specifically
If, however, the insurgent reverts to guerrilla warfare doctrine -striking at random without a clear objective or pattern -then military counter-insurgency operations are more vaguely defined; parameters for task completion are more unclear and trickier to measure. Such becomes the counter-insurgent's dilemma.
Having lost so much, however, and now being denied the ability to operate as it did in the past, guerrilla warfare may be the one approach that can protract Boko Haram's campaign and simultaneous make Nigerian Army forces tasked with security, look amateurish. Here, indeed, Boko Haram may well be at its most dangerous. There is now less need to calculate for the long-term; less incentive to be methodical, and more benefit in being spontaneous and highly unpredictable. Cumulative campaign losses also mean that, for Boko Haram, objectives must now smaller and limited: tactical, rather than strategic. (Middlemas & Barnes, 1969, p. 722) , reinterpreted for the contemporary popular discourses on martyrdom operations, it has been argued that "the [suicide] bomber will always get through" (The Economist, 2005; Bishop, 2004) . Now, as has been pointed out, suicide bombers do not in fact always get through (The Economist, 2004; Corte & Giménez-Salinas, 2009 ). There are countermeasures and levels of vigilance to potentially identify likely bombers and, failing that, to guard against the detonation having maximum effect; even if the chances of entirely preventing it are still low (Dzikansky, Kleiman, & Slater, 2012) . Here, however, surprise and subterfuge remain perhaps the bomber's most valuable secondary resources; availability of which drastically improves the chances of the bomber reaching the target. At that point, it is left to the skill of the bomb maker, to the quality and quantity of available materials, to the bomber's discretion, and to the availability of nearby soft targets, to determine casualty numbers.
As an example, Boko Haram's suicide bombing success rate was virtually 100 per cent when the tactic was first introduced. With the Army and security forces used to gun attacks, there was no inbuilt resilience against the threat of the suicide bomber, when the first ones struck in 2011. And with freer access to external operational assistance for istishhad, as well as less restricted movement of seemingly innocuous IED materials such as Ammonium Nitrate (Adeoye, 2012) , Boko Haram's introduction of istishhad would change the calculus of war in north-east Nigeria. Indeed, istishhad brought about a marked shift of traditional tactical warfare; thrusting the Nigerian military into territory with which it had little to no experience against.
In Maiduguri for instance, even though the Nigerian Army was the nucleus of the land component, the police were the only component with bomb disposable capabilities and had to be called when the threat emerged, as it did on occasion (Adeoye, 2012) .
Over the years however, as security forces built resilience to Boko Haram's bombers, there have been increased instances of failed attempts by Boko Haram. Some denotations have been premature and casualties thus limited; others, initially failed, were eventually detonated remotely by specialist bomb squads (Adeoye, 2012) . And on a few occasions, the bombersbeing unable to penetrate the series of army, police and civilian vigilante checkpoints that have come to punctuate parts of north-east Nigeria -end up as the only fatalities (Marama, 2016; Iaccino, 2015; Abrak & Ola, 2014; Vanguard, 2016d) . Still, perhaps the broader point being made by proponents of the "suicide bomber always getting through" thesis is that, on the balance of probability, if the insurgent keeps refining his plans, reselecting targets and sending more suicide bombers, the chances of one eventually getting through, are high (Dzikansky, Kleiman, & Slater, 2012) .
More than just an ability to penetrate defences, however, the tactic of suicide bombing also gives war avoidance a new meaning insofar as the insurgent can project power "cheaply", with low relative cost to overall campaign resources (Dzikansky, Kleiman, & Slater, 2012) . And the larger the capabilities gap between insurgent and counter-insurgent, the more the impact of each successful bombing, as a show of strength aimed at bridging that asymmetry. This is consistent with Géré's observation that "the suicide volunteer is the response of last resort in a strategic situation marked by fundamental asymmetry between the adversaries" (2007, p. 392).
Indeed, just because the insurgent employs istishhad, does not mean it is a tactic of first choice; all else being equal. In the case of Boko Haram, around the period when it was able to reduce asymmetry by other means -such as by fielding an overt front, training it, acquiring platforms and equipment and so on -tactical dependence on istishhad also reduced. Thus, as the graphic below suggests, between 2013 and early 2015, military fighting and credible attempts to capture and defend territory greatly escalated within Boko Haram's insurgency, compared to previous years. Boko Haram's reversion to guerrilla warfare and war avoidance -choosing to attack civilians and soft targets rather than fight hardened military locations for territory since 2015-therefore suggests that istishhad is a last resort, not a first; a tactic born of necessity, rather than selected from a pool of equally viable military options. This idea that martyrdom operations are acceptable in irregular warfare, where the insurgent is being hammered and faces imminent defeat, is mired in controversy.
Understanding the Religious Debate: Is Istishhad Permissible Under Any Circumstances?
As much today as historically, the debate on whether or not istishhad is permissible, as a military option in violent (lesser) jihad, is conflicted. Shi'a Islamist militant group, Ḥizbu 'llāh, who at a time were prolific in the use of istishhad, said in 1999 that "if we [Ḥizbu 'llāh] had possessed conventional weapons with which to fight the Israeli invader, martyrdom would have been an illegitimate means. It was necessity that permitted recourse to martyrdom operations" (Géré, 2007, p. 392 (Schmid, 2011, p. 23 and Al-Shabaab. The notion, moreover, that these groups do not understand the Qur'an or that they are "misguided" may not be entirely true. Such groups simply have may have chosen to interpret it differently. As Assaf Moghadam notes, in a quoted excerpt from an interview with Alex Schmid, groups using terrorism in the name of Islam do not necessarily represent "deviant sects", but are often guided by a radical interpretation of the religion (Schmid, 2011, p. 25 ).
The debate of whether it is permissible under any circumstances aside, the fact remains that, on the strategic, operational and tactical levels, istishhad is viable tool for the insurgent. As
Géré observes, "On the strategic level, it [martyrdom operations] at least partially redresses imbalances in capacities. On the logistical level, it is a useful, effective, inexpensive, easily renewable weapon. And on the tactical level, it is effective because it relies on human intelligence" (2007, p. 392).
The Tactic of Istishhad (Martyrdom Operations) in Boko Haram's Insurgency.
Within the range of tactics employed withinBoko Haram's covert front, istishhad in particular has been an area the Nigerian Army has failed to fully understand much less implement a failsafe counter against. Boko Haram's mastery of istishhad is consistent with the experience of other terrorist organizations. This area of guerrilla warfare is one where several other perpetrator groups, globally, tend to get proficient at fairly rapidly (Moghadam, 2011 ). This
should not be surprising insofar as the logistics themselves are fairly unsophisticated: a belt, explosives, sometimes a vehicle, and either a willing or a coerced suicide bomber (Géré, 2007, pp. 391-392) . However, so much could go wrong between bomb-making and eventual detonation, that many suicide attacks also end up being unsuccessful. This is seldom a tactic with a hundred percent success rate, because "success" is dependent on a range of factors outside the bomber's control. For instance, even a last-minute change of venue, or additional unscheduled security measures on site, could mean that even if everything else goes to plan, the bomber has much fewer victims, or limited access, on arrival. For such reasons, the casualties-to-suicide attack ratio has in many cases been typically low (Moghadam, 2011);  especially considering the bomber is typically counted as a fatality in each successful detonation.
Use of istishhad so relatively early in its life cycle, and so efficiently -virtually all Boko
Haram's early bombings resulted in successful detonations and multiple casualties -served as an indicator of Boko Haram's forthcoming battlefield innovations. It also indicated that Boko Haram was technically proficient, even more so than the average insurgent, at the tactic of suicide bombings. And because this particular guerrilla tactic also had never been used in Nigeria, the shock and awe effect of each attack was magnified. Indeed, scepticism greeted the first few suicide bombings. Some Nigerians who heard of the new tactic dismissed it as oneoff, or said it simply confirmed suspicions that Boko Haram fighters were not Nigerian;
because Nigerians love their lives too much, to blow themselves up.
Yet the rampancy of the tactic since 2011 made it clear that suicide bombing was not a one-off tactic by Boko Haram; it had become, sadly, a Nigerian phenomenon that somehow had to be dealt with.
Istishhad as a tactic has been almost exclusive to Boko Haram's covert front. It very rarely has been employed in combination with overt irregulars, on offensive operations. In understanding the tactic therefore, it becomes necessary to further study Boko Haram's covert front.
Boko Haram's covert front initially constituted a loose network of "sleeper" terrorist cells sophisticated the tactic even more, using a combination of more powerful IEDs to cause larger casualties, and women and children, to introduce a heightened element of surprise.
Use of Women and Children in Suicide Attacks.
Use of female suicide bombers since 2014 further evolved Boko Haram's covert threat (Pearson, 2014a; 2014b) . The female suicide bomber, however, is not a uniquely Nigerian phenomenon. As François Géré observes, "Islamist groups are by no means averse to recruiting women. Even nowadays women arouse somewhat less suspicion, and they are as highly motivated as men" (2007, p. 389 It is, as a result, highly inadvisable for such pat downs to occur; as they break local customs around the taboo between the sexes. Indeed, anything other than minimal public interaction between male soldiers and local civilian women adhering to strict Islamic laws, may be problematic. This has been the case elsewhere, moreover -it is not a northern Nigerian phenomenon.
In Iraq, for instance, a serving officer once pointed out, regarding this separation between sexes and the counter-insurgent's resulting dilemma, "you really have to have female counterinsurgents if you are expecting to have a successful counterinsurgency strategy […] if you cannot access or even deliver a message to half of the population just because of this taboo between the sexes, you're at an enormous disadvantage in trying to persuade people that you're there for reasons that are in their interests" (Thompson, 2011) . Writing her article, When half the Country is Off Limits, Caitlin Thompson highlights the fact that female civilians do not want to be searched publicly by male soldiers; and, for male civilians watching such incidents, they tend to feel more than uncomfortable. In Iraq, Thompson notes, "'Lioness' teams of female Marines had to be formed, to "conduct searches of local women" (2011).
One possible solution then, would be to use female soldiers to pat down female civilians. And, certainly, as far back as 2012 in the north-east Nigeria insurgency, there have been female personnel, typically from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), who have been trained and assigned to pat down and search females at checkpoints and duty posts (Danmadami, 2012) . The JTF ORO Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (ACOS G3), Colonel Musa Danmadami, pointed out to me that this was a role that the NSCDC female personnel adopted across the theatre, in security protocols at mosques, for instance.
However, these non-military female personnel were a tiny fraction, less than one per cent if that, of total male operatives. The extremely low number of non-military female operatives meant that female-specific searches have in turn been rare and infrequent.
For Boko Haram, this infrequency of female searches, relative to males, meant that the planning around avoidance of checkpoints became largely moot; particularly when the tactic was first introduced. Such females, typically young girls, had easier access through checkpoints and military roadblocks -in many cases, they were just let through. Pat downs and searches by male soldiers who manned virtually all locations may otherwise have been construed as harassment of local women; as even the public at the time was unaware that Boko Haram had identified the local customs and perceptions around public interaction and physical contact with women, as an area to be exploited. Consequently, the compulsory use of some form of covering, typically the niqāb in areas affected by the insurgency, appears to have provided a tactical opening, in Boko Haram's perversion of Islamic practices, to facilitate its suicide bombings.
Istishhad as an Incredibly Asymmetric Weapon
In this regard, Boko Haram's use of women and young girls in istishhad, as female suicide bombers, makes it one of the few perpetrator groups in the world willing to use this particular demographic, for martyrdom operations. It is, however, an incredibly asymmetric weapon with great tactical value to the insurgent. As Debra Zedalis writes, "terrorist organizations use women as weapons because they provide tactical advantage: stealthier attack, element of surprise, hesitancy to search women, female stereotype (e.g., nonviolent); increased number of combatants; increased publicity (greater publicity = larger number of recruits); psychological effect" (2004, p. 7). For a guerrilla that has more or less exhausted his tactical options, and thus spent his element of surprise, introducing female and child suicide bombers reignites that element and could present the illusion that a degraded and weakened insurgent is still potent and able to strike at will. This is the power of istishhad, especially where women and children become operatives of the tactic. In the words of Magnus Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, the tactic of the female suicide bomber "…is the ultimate asymmetric weapon" (Don Van Natta, 2003) .
Conclusion
In discussing Boko Haram's covert front of operations, to focus solely on Istishhad would be to neglect the broad activity spectrum of the group's covert activity. Journal article tells the story of Abba, a 12-year old from a local tsangaya (Qur'anic school, typically for children of a social class called almajiri 7 ). Abba, the report notes, was given a cell phone and ask to call "whenever he saw soldiers pass". For months, this individual played no other role, save this singular covert one, for Boko Haram (Hinshaw & Parkinson, 2016) . MAMs also play a more insidious role, within the covert front however, namely that of active sabotage.
Young boys between the ages of nine and 15 for instance "said they had been given $30 and a keg of gasoline to set fire to their schools" (Hinshaw & Parkinson, 2016 
